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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp 171–198 | Cite as

Experimental results on ultimatum games with incomplete information

  • Michael Mitzkewitz
  • Rosemarie Nagel
Research Articles

Abstract

This paper is about experiments on two versions of ultimatum games with incomplete information, called the offer game and the demand game. We apply the strategy method, that is, each subject had to design a complete strategy in advance instead of reacting spontaneously to a situation which occurs in the game. Game theory predicts very similar outcomes for the offer and the demand games. Our experiments, however, show significant differences in behavior between both games. Using the strategy method, allows us to explore the motivations leading to those differences. Since each subject played the same version of the game eight rounds against changing anonymous opponents we can also study subjects' learning behavior. We propose a theory of boundedly rational behavior, called the “anticipation philosophy”, which is well supported by the experimental data.

Keywords

Experimental Data Economic Theory Game Theory Incomplete Information Rational Behavior 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Mitzkewitz
    • 1
  • Rosemarie Nagel
    • 1
  1. 1.Wirtschaftstheorie IUniversity BonnBonnGermany

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