Abstract
We study value theory for a class of games called games withn players andr alternatives. In these games, each of then players must choose one and only one of ther alternatives. A linear, efficient value is obtained using three characterizations, two of which are axiomatic. This value yields an a priori evaluation for each player relative to each alternative.
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Bolger, E.M. A value for games withn players andr alternatives. Int J Game Theory 22, 319–334 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240129
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240129