Abstract
In this paper the formation of expectations during decision making processes on pension schemes is the main focus. An overlapping generations model is used where politicians control the tax-transfer system and the young determine savings. No generation of decision makers is committed to previous decisions. It appears that the outcome in the stationary state depends on the efficiency of the tax-transfer system compared with savings and on the preferences of politicians relative to young individuals with respect to the division of endowments between young-age and old-age consumption. One of the main conclusions is that if the parameters of the system are constant the stationary state enters within a finite time interval. So, if the system is initially outside the stationary state, the decision makers can calculate the path of taxes and savings towards the stationary state. This feature is also used to determine the effects of a demographic change.
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Comments from Dieter Bös, Fons Groot, Lex Meijdam, Willem Thorbecke, and David Wildasin are gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are, of course, ours.
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Verbon, H.A.A., Verhoeven, M.J.M. Decision making on pension schemes under rational expectations. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 56, 71–97 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01239492
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01239492