Abstract
The impact of asymmetries between partners on the likelihood of establishing successful research and development and production joint ventures relative to the alternative of own development is assessed analytically. The often empirically observed 50/50 sharing rule in asymmetric alliances is compared to a bargained rule, where asymmetries in absorptive capacity, as well as R&D and production efficiency are explicitly taken into account. Industry settings in which successful asymmetric alliances are more likely to occur are pinpointed. The analysis focuses on the influence of the size and format of these asymmetries, the technological appropriability and complementarity between partners on the incentives for both partners to cooperate as well as to cheat on the venture agreement. The results are compared to a setting where the joint venture is only involved in R&D.
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Veugelers, R., Kesteloot, K. Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the matthew effect catalyzing?. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 64, 23–51 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01237524
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01237524