Skip to main content
Log in

On the strategic potential of technological aid in international environmental relations

  • Articles
  • Published:
Journal of Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Prior to noncooperative choices of abatement of a transboundary pollutant, a technologically advanced country considers making an unconditional transfer of abatement technology to its less-advanced rival. Even though technological aid is given unconditionally and abatement strategies are chosen noncooperatively, in a number of plausible circumstances, a transfer of a superior control technology will induce Pareto-superior pollution abatement.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Barrett, S. (1994): “Self Enforcing International Environmental Agreements.”Oxford Economic Papers 46: 878–894.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baumol, W. J., and Oates W. E. (1988):The Theory of Environmental Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benedick, R. E. (1991):Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bergstrom, T., Blume, L., and Varian, H. (1986): “On the Private Provision of Public Goods.”Journal of Public Economics 29: 25–49.

    Google Scholar 

  • Black, J., Levi, M. D., and de Meza, D. (1993): “Creating a Good Atmosphere: Minimum Participation for Tackling the ‘Greenhouse Effect’.”Economica 60: 281–293.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchholz, W., and Konrad, K. (1994): “Global Environmental Problems and the Strategic Choice of Technology.”Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 60: 299–321.

    Google Scholar 

  • — (1995): “Strategic Transfers and Private Provision of Public Goods.”Journal of Public Economics 57: 489–505.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carraro, C., and Siniscalco, D. (1993): “Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment.”Journal of Public Economics 52: 309–328.

    Google Scholar 

  • Copeland, B. (1990): “Strategic Enhancement and Destruction of Fisheries and the Environment in the Presence of International Externalities.”Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 19: 212–226.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coppel, J. (1994): “Implementing a Global Abatement Policy: The Role of Transfers.” InThe Economics of Climate Change. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cornes, R., and Sandler, T. (1986):The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • De Canio, S., and Lee, K. N. (1991): “Doing Well by Doing Good: Technology Transfer to Protect the Ozone.”Policy Studies Journal 19: 140–151.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dixit, A. (1980): “The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence.”Economic Journal 90: 95–106.

    Google Scholar 

  • French, H. (1992): “Strengthening Global Environmental Governance.” InState of the World 1992, edited by L. Brown. New York: W. W. Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg, D., and Tirole, J. (1984): “The Fat Cat Effect, the Puppy Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look.”American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 74: 361–368.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilbert, R. J. (1989): “Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency.” InHandbook of Industrial Organization, vol. I, edited by R.Schmalensee and R. Willig. New York: Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heaton, D., Sobin, R., and Repetto, R. (1991):Transforming Technology: An Agenda for Environmentally Stable Growth in the 21st Century. Washington DC: World Resource Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Helfand, G., and Rubin, J. (1994): “Spreading versus Concentrating Damages: Environmental Policies in the Presence of Nonconvexities.”Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27: 84–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoel, M. (1991): “Global Environmental Problems: the Effects of Unilateral Actions Taken by One Country.”Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 20: 55–70.

    Google Scholar 

  • Konrad, K. (1994): “The Strategic Advantage of Being Poor: Private and Public Provision of Public Goods.”Economica 61: 79–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levy, M., Keohane, R., and Haas, P. (1993): “Improving the Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions.” InInstitutions for the Earth, edited by P. Haas, R. Keohane, and M. Levy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maler, K.-G. (1991): “International Environmental Problems.” InEconomic Policy Towards the Environment, edited by D. Helm, Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marjit, S. (1990): “On a Non-cooperative Theory of Technology Transfer.”Economics Letters 33: 293–298.

    Google Scholar 

  • von Moltke, K. (1992): “International Trade, Technology Transfer and Climate Change.” InConfronting Climate Change: Risks, Implications and Responses, edited by I. Mintzer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Parsons, E. (1993): “Protecting the Ozone Layer.” InInstitutions for the Earth, edited by P. Haas, R. Keohane, and M. Levy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pearce, D. (Ed.) (1991):Blueprint 2: Greening the World Economy. London: Earthscan Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sandler, T., and Sargent, K. (1995): “Management of Transnational Commons: Coordination, Publicness and Treaty Formation.”Land Economics 71: 145–162.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varian, H. (1994): “Sequential Contributions to Public Goods”.Journal of Public Economics 53: 165–186.

    Google Scholar 

  • Welsch, H. (1993): “An Equilibrium Framework for Global Pollution Problems.”Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 25: S64-S79.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Stranlund, J.K. On the strategic potential of technological aid in international environmental relations. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 64, 1–22 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01237523

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01237523

Keywords

JEL Classifications

Navigation