Abstract
In this paper, the endogenous order of quantity decision is studied in a duopoly model with incomplete information. One firm knows the state of the demand curve while the other firm remains uninformed. Firms have to commit to a quantity in one out of two periods. While, a priori, simultaneous-move Cournot equilibria are possible, only Stackelberg equilibria, with either the informed or the uninformed firm moving first, emerge endogenously.
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Normann, HT. Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information. Journal of Economics Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie 66, 177–187 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01234405
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01234405