This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
References
T. W. Anderson: An Introduction to Multivariate Statistical Analysis, New York, 1958.
T. Basar and Y. Ho: Informational Properties of the Nash Solutions of Two Stochastic Nonzero-Sum Games, Journal of Economic Theory7 (1974), pp. 370–384.
J. Bertrand: Book Review of “Théorie Mathématique de la Richesse Social” and of “Recherches sur les Principes Mathématique de la Theorie des Richesses”, Journal des Savants (1883), pp. 499–508.
L. Cheng: Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria: A Geometric Approach, Rand Journal of Economics16 (1985), pp. 146–152.
R. N. Clarke: Duopolists Don't Wish to Share Information, Economics Letters11 (1983), pp. 33–36.
R. N. Clarke: Collusion and the Incentives for Information Sharing, Bell Journal of Economics14 (1983), pp. 383–394.
V. P. Crawford and J. Sobel: Strategic Information Transmission, Econometrica50 (1982), pp. 1431–1451.
A. A. Cournot: Recherches sur les Principes Mathématique de la Théorie des Richesses, Paris, 1838.
A. Dixit: A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers, Bell Journal of Economics10 (1979), pp. 20–32.
J. Friedman: Oligopoly and the Theory of Games, Amsterdam, 1977.
E. Gal-Or: Information Sharing in Oligopoly, Econometrica53 (1985), pp. 329–343.
J. C. Harsanyi: Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, Parts I–III, Management Science14 (1967–68), pp. 159–182, 320–334, 486–502.
N. J. Hathaway and J. A. Richard: Equilibria of Price-Setting and Quantity-Setting Duopolies, Economics Letters3 (1979), pp. 133–137.
J. D. Hess: The Economics of Organization, Amsterdam, 1983.
W. Krelle: Preistheorie 1, Tübingen, Second edition, 1976, (First edition, 1961).
J. Marschak and R. Radner: Economic Theory of Teams, New Haven, Conn., 1972.
W. Novshek and H. Sonnenschein: Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release, Bell Journal of Economics13 (1982), pp. 214–218.
K. Okuguchi: Equilibrium Prices in the Bertrand and Cournot Oligopolies, Mimeo, Tokyo Metropolitan University, 1984.
J. P. Ponssard: The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market, Management Science25 (1979), pp. 240–250.
Y. Sakai: The Value of Information in a Simple Duopoly Model, Journal of Economic Theory36 (1985), pp. 36–54.
R. Selten: Reexamination of the Prefectness Concept for Equilibrium Point in Extensive Games, International Journal of Game Theory4 (1975), pp. 25–55.
M. Shubik: Market Structure and Behavior, Cambridge, Mass., 1980.
H. Sonnenschein: The Dual of Duopoly is Complementary Monopoly; or, Two of Cournot's Theories are One, Journal of Political Economy76 (1968), pp. 316–318.
X. Vives: Duopoly Information Equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand, Journal of Economic Theory34 (1984), pp. 71–94.
X. Vives: On the Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria with Product Differentiation, Journal of Economic Theory36 (1985), pp. 166–175.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
I am indebted to Koji Okuguchi, Yoshihiko Otani, Mamoru Kaneko, and seminar participants at University of Tsukuba, Yokohama City University, Osaka University, and Tokyo Center for Economic Research for helpful discussions. I would also like to thank the editor and two referees of this journal for useful comments and suggestions. Any shortcomings that may remain are of course mine. This research was supported in part by the University of Tsukuba Project on the Role of Information in Industrial Organization.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Sakai, Y. Cournot and bertrand equilibria under imperfect information. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 46, 213–232 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01229301
Received:
Revised:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01229301