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Färe, R., Shorrocks, A.F., Giovannini, A. et al. Book reviews. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 60, 109–124 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01228028
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01228028