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I wish to thank Kalyan Chatterjee, Joseph Harrington, and Gary Lilien for their comments or suggestions. The paper has also benefitted from the suggestions of the managing editor and the referees.
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Nti, K.O. More potential entrants may lead to less competition. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 49, 47–70 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227872
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227872