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Unemployment insurance and union bargaining — an insider-outsider approach

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Abstract

A trade union is required to tax its own members to fund unemployment benefit paid to its unemployed members in an insider-outsider model of union bargaining over wages and employment. An increase in unemployment benefit imposed by the government increases employment overall but not necessarily the employment of insiders if the tax rate is exogenously fixed by the government.

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This paper has benefited from comments of Mick Common, Dipak Ghosh, Bob Hart, and Robin Ruffell. The comments of two anonymous referees and the advice of the Editor have greatly improved the presentation of the paper. Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors.

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Levin, E.J., Moutos, T. Unemployment insurance and union bargaining — an insider-outsider approach. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 53, 271–284 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227625

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227625

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