Abstract
This paper examines a close parallel between the theory of fairness and Harel and Nitzan's original definition of non-exchangeable rights system. Several independent definitions of fair rights assignment are proposed, and some new impossibility as well as possibility results are established.
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For helpful discussions I would like to thank Rajat Deb, Shlomo Weber and Hans Wiesmeth. I am also indebted to two anonymous referees of thisJournal for their valuable comments.
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Gekker, R. On the impossibility of an envy-free Paretian liberal. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 53, 75–82 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227016
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227016