Summary
This paper establishes that an optical contract, combining features of the well-known Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Townsend (1979, 1983) models, resembles banking. The contract and the associated allocations are derived from a social planner's problem which contains the Diamond and Dybvig and Townsend models as sub-problems. The analysis accomplishes the following. It unites the liquidity preference and cost minimization literatures in a simple way; resolves the demand deposit/demand equity problem in the Diamond and Dybvig model; introduces a notion of efficient bankruptcies into the liquidity preference literature; and raises some questions about the government regulation vs. laissez faire banking debate.
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I wish to thank John Boyd, Joseph Haubrich, Jeffrey Lacker, Ramon Marimon, Edward C. Prescott, two anonymous referees, and especially Neil Wallace for useful comments. I also wish to thank the National Science Foundation for financial support from grant number 89-09242.
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Villamil, A.P. Demand deposit contracts, suspension of convertibility, and optimal financial intermediation. Econ Theory 1, 277–288 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01210565
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01210565