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Reference notes
Cf Martin Rothll, “Schizophrenia and the Theories of Thomas Szasz,”British Journal of Psychiatry 129: pp. 317–326; Martin Roth and J. Kroll,The Reality of Mental Illness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); R. E. Kendell, “The Concept of Disease and its Implications for Psychiatry,”British Journal of Psychiatry 127: pp. 305–315.
Cf Thomas Szasz, “The Myth of Mental Illness,”American Psychologist 15: pp. 113–118.
Cf H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.,The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), esp. pp. 157–195.
Cf Christopher Boorse, “On the Distinction Between Disease and Illness,”Philosophy & Public Affairs, 5, 1: pp. 49–68.
Cf Norman Daniels,Just Health Care (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
Cf Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” inEssays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19800, pp. 3–19.
Cf Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”Analysis 23, 6: pp. 121–123. Also see Richard Feldman's “An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples” inAustraliasian Journal of Philosophy; 52, 1: pp. 68–69 where he argues in support of Gettier. For responses to Gettier see Roderick M. Chisholm'sThe Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982; esp. pp. 43–49.
Recently philosophers have been trying to state the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. Such attempts usually take the following form. S knows thatp if and only if a)p is true. b) S believes thatp. c) S is justified in believing thatp. The central problem for these philosophers is that they must give some account of what would constitute justification, that is, that S is “justified” in believing thatp. The approaches vary such that they offer different degrees of epistemic justification. Thus in accounts of epistemic justification one could expect to see anything form a) having some presumption in its favor, b) acceptability, c) being beyond reasonable doubt, d) being evident and e) being certain.Cf Roderick Chisholm's “A Version of Foundationalism” in Paul K. Moser and Arnold Vander Nat'sHuman Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 293–308, esp. p. 296.
Cf Harry G. Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person;”What is a Person; Ed. Michael F. Goodman, (NJ: Humana Press, 1988), pp. 127–144, esp. 129.
Ibid., Cf p. 132.
Ibid., Cf 1p. 128.
Ibid., Cf p. 130.
The literature on the medico-legal implications of assessing and assigning legal or moral responsibility to the mentally ill is quite extensive, but see Michael S. Moore,Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking The Relationship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Leo Katz,Bad Acts and Guilty Minds (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987; Norval Morris,Madness and the Criminal Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
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Potter, D.M., Cust, K.F.T. Book reviews. J Med Hum 13, 51–61 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01146458
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01146458