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Andrés Bello y López (1781–1865) was born in Venezuela and acquired Chilean citizenship later. Known as one of the best humanists of Latin-America, his masterpieces debate issues related to Philosophy, Grammar, Linguistics, and International Law. He also wrote poetry.
As found in Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks,The legal process: basic problems in the making and application of the law ed. William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey (Westbury, NY: The Foundation Press, 1994 [1958]), 1374–1380.
Julien A. Greimas' semiotic theory is primarily devoted to discussions of semantics. One of its most interesting characteristics is the difference between it and hermeneutics or interpretation. Semiotics does not study the relationship between text and referent. On the other hand, interpretation works with texts to explain their meaning to reality. In other words, hermeneutics is always conditioned by both the situations existent when the text was produced and read. See A.J. Greimas and J. Courtés,Semiotics and Language. An Analytical Dictionary , trld. Larry Cristet al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 141–142. Notwithstanding these differences, the nature of the interpreter affects both semiotics and interpretation. Her background, level of education, intelligence, etc. permeate the result of the task, no matter how “neutral” she intends to be.
Desiderio Blanco López and Raúl Bueno Chávez,Metodología Del Análisis Semiótico (Semiotics Analysis Methodology) (Lima: Universo, 1983).
Greimas & Courtés define it asany entity endowed with meaning, belonging either to spoken strings or to written texts, prior to any linguistics or logical analysis. See Greimas & Courtés,supra note 5, at 363. This will be discussed later on this work in I.2.1.
This can be understood as a unit that appears as anautonomous figure in the semiotic universe. See Greimas & Courtés,supra note 5, at 7 and I.2.2infra.
See I.2.2infra.
I will use these semic figures in a way similar to Greimas'semiotic figure. That is,as a second-degree unit, divisible into those simple units that are the terms of the figurative categories (phemes or semes). See Greimas & Courtés,supra note 5, at 120. Accordingly, semic figure will correspond to the unit divisible into semes. See footnote 11 and I.3infra.
Seme is theminimal unit of signification that existsbecause of the differential gap that opposes it to other semes. See Greimas & Courtés,supra note 5, at 278. See also table 1 and I.3infra.
Expression that designates the way in which the elements of the semiotic theory fit together (See Greimas & Courtés,supra note 5, at 132).
The scheme comes from Blanco & Bueno,supra note 6 at 27.
Greimas & Courtés explain that the semiotic theory distinguishes three areas, namely: semio-narrative structures, discursive structures and textual ones. According to the authors, the textual structures aresituated, in fact, outside of the generative trajectory, properly speaking. See Greimas & Courtés,supra note 5, at 133.
These articles have general application in the whole Chilean legal system, including the interpretation of the Chilean constitution. These articles were inspired by 1825's Code of Louisiana, which was an amendment to another Louisianan code of 1808, namedDigeste de la loi civile. The source of the latter was the project of civil code drafted in 1800 by Portalis, Tronchet and Male Ville, grounded in Jean Domat's (1625–1696)Les lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel”. See Alejandro Guzmán Brito, “La historia dogmática de las normas sobre interpretación recibidas por el código civil de Chile” (The Dogmatic History Of the Rules About Interpretation Received By the Chilean Civil Code), inInterpretación, Integración y Razonamiento Jurídico (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile 1992), 41–87.
“As long as Statutory Interpretation remains a fruitful field of scholarship, Hart and Sacks will and should be read and studied”, claim Eskridge and Frickey. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at CXXXIV–CXXXV.
In E, the U.S. scholars say that the respect of the position of the legislature and the constitutional procedures for the enactment of bills has a corollary, which is that the courts ought never to give the words of a statute a meaning they will not bear. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1375.
The last one has two limitations that are also explained in the Note. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1379.
Explained in E. The Meaning the Words Will Not Bear. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1375–1376.
Explained in F. Policies of Clear Statement. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1376–1377.
See article 23supra. For further analysis on this, see Due objects' thematic roles (II.2.d)infra.
Explained in C. A Concise Statement of the Task. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1374.
From H. Interpreting the Words To Carry Out the Purpose. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1380.
The narrative program (NP)is composed of an utterance of doing governing an utterance of state (...) It is to be interpreted as a change of state effected by any subject (S1) affecting any subject (S2). See Greimas & Courtés,supra note 5, at 245. In this utterance S1 are the Rules that affect the Interpreter (S2) by ordering her to reach the genuine meaning.
The interpreter may succeed or fail in her task. See II.2.b Narrative Programsinfra.
Idem note 25.
Actantial rolesare defined in terms of the actant's position within the narrative trajectory, and the particular modal investment of the actant (...) the subject-actant will be endowed successively with modalities such as those of wanting-to-do, knowing-how-to-do, or being-able-to-do. See Greimas & Courtés,supra note 5, at 6.
The dichotomy surface/deep structures is used to distinguishthe fundamental (deep) grammar and the narrative (surface) grammar in the strict sense (superficial), the former having a logic-semantic nature, the latter having an anthropomorphic nature. See Greimas & Courtés,supra note 5, at 317.
Chief policy-determining agency of the society, subject only to the limitations of the constitution under which it exercises its powers. Legislaturealso depends upon the good faith and good sense of the agencies of authoritative interpretation. Explained in B. The Mood in Which the Task Should Be Done. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1374.
Language has a special nature when used as a medium for giving authoritative general directions. Every statute is a part in the law and partakes the qualities of law, and particularly of striving for even-handed justice. Explained in B. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1374.
The definiteness may be such that resolution of a doubt about purpose resolves (...) a question of specific application (...)Or a purpose may be deliberately formulated with great generality ... Explained in G.2. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1377.
Then the authors set out two limitations to this on a prescriptive way. Explained in G.4. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1379.
In G.5, Hart & Sacks say that in the absence of reasons of self-interest or the like for discounting the construction, it is persuasive evidence that the meaning is a natural one. Considerations of the stability of transactions and of existing understandings counsel in favor of its acceptance, if possible. In cases where the construction has been widely accepted and consistently adhered, it may be said to fix the meaning — to be the meaning which experience has demonstrated the words will bear. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1379–1380.
Comments about law. In B: - The position of the legislature: Chief policy — determining agency of the society, subject only to the limitations of the constitution under which it exercises its powers. Legislature also depends upon the good faith and good sense of the agencies of authoritative interpretation. - Nature of law. Every statute is a part in the law and partakes the qualities of law, and particularly of striving for even-handed justice. In E: - The proposition (...) is a corollary of the propositions that courts are bound to respect the constitutional position of the legislature and the constitutional procedures for the enactment of legislation. - The words of the statute are what the legislature has enacted as law, and all that it has the power to enact. - Unenacted intentions or wishes cannot be given effect as law. -Courts on occasion can correct mistakes (...) but they cannot permit the legislative process, and all the other processes which depend upon the integrity of language, to be subverted by the misuse of words.- So-called maxims of construction (...) are useful as reassurances about the meaning. - The proposition that words must not be given a meaning they will not bear operates almost wholly to prevent rather than compel expansion of the scope of statutes. In F: - These policies of clear statement may on occasions operate to defeat the actual, consciously held intention of particular legislators (...) They constitute conditions on the effectual exercise of legislative power. - The policies have been judicially developed to promote the objectives of the legal system, which transcend the wishes of any particular session of the legislature. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3.
Comments about linguistics. In B: - The nature of language. Language has a special nature when used as a medium for giving authoritative general directions. In D: - The words of the statute (...) serve both as guides in the attribution of general purpose and as factors limiting the particular meaning that can be attributed. - When the words fit with all the relevant elements (...) the mind of the interpreter moves to a confident conclusion.- Interpretation seems always to be involved when meaning is communicated. - Interpretation requires a conscious effort when words do not fit with their context (...) In E: - A court needs to be linguistically wise and not naïve. It needs to understand (...) that meaning depends upon the context. - Language is a social institution. Humpty Dumpty was wrong when he said that you can make words mean whatever you want them to mean. - The language belongs to the whole society. - Unabridged dictionaries are historical records (...) of the meanings (...) used by writers of good repute. They are often useful in answering hard questions. - So-called maxims of construction (...) are useful as reassurance about the meaning. - The meaning of the words can almost always be narrowed if the context seems to call for narrowing. In F: - In various types of situations wise policy counsels against giving words an unusual meaning. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3,.
D moves through law and linguistics, trying to provide a reasoned source to the theory of legal interpretation. When it talks about the double part played by words — a) factor together with the relevant elements of the context and b) separate factor that limit in checking hypotheses-, it seems that an implicit reference or analogy can be grasped. This double part is very close in its effects to the linguistic distinction between syntagmatic and paradigmatic elements. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1375.
For instance, suppose the case in which a FLRA has to deal with a problem of interpretation. According to the authors, a court would develop the first part of the task of interpretation, even though FLRA is the institution charged with thefist-line responsibility for applying the statute authoritatively. A second case of contradiction happens when the note establishes only legislative history and popular construction as factors that FLRA has to observe in discharging its function (the rest of the directions of the text are addressed to courts). Thus, FLRA do not have to follow all the advice developed in E and F, even though these are the sections related to attributing meaning to the words of the statute). However, those sections bind courts. There is no logical basis for that distinction. A third unreasonable point is found when considering that the role of agencies charged with official responsibility of any kind is disregarded until section H. Consequently, these agencies do not have to follow any of the directions stated from A to H. But if their interpretation is uniform, the courtshould give weight to that interpretation. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1380. Another contradiction appears when the sentencesmeaning depends upon context (E) andwords that do not fit with context (D) are compared. If the first one is true, the meaning of the words should always fit with context. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1375.
The sentence, [A]resolution of a doubt about purpose resolves, without more, a question of specific application (as advice to infer purpose. See G.2.a, Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1377) show that the particular meaning of the words has first to be interpreted to attribute the purpose of the statute.
This isthe visual representation of the logical articulation of any semantic category (Greimas and Courtés,supra note 5, at 308).
Richard Posner questioned the level of understanding of the real world's consequences of the different interpretations that Hart and Sacks' Note established. See William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,Cases and Materials On Legislation. Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (St.Paul: West Publishing Co. 1995). 563. I disagree with this skepticism, especially if we consider the concept of the larger and subtler purpose in which the immediate one must be fitted, and all the contextual relevance that the latter has.
Greimas & Courtés define it as, “The entire text which precedes and/or accompanies the syntagmatic unit under consideration and upon which the signification depends...” See Greimas and Courtés,supra note 5, at 58.
SeeWebster's New World College Dictionary (Cleveland: Macmillan, 1997), 301.
In G.4 they refer to post-enactment aids, and presumptions. According to the second meaning of context, it is tenable to include post-enactment aids and presumptions as part of the context, even though Hart and Sacks located them in G.5 and G.6. See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1379–1380.
See Hart & Sacks,supra note 3, at 1376.
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Chilean lawyer, LL.B. ('95) Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile. LL.M. candidate ('98) Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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Frías, M.V.C. Beyond the basics of statutory interpretation. Int J Semiot Law 11, 115–153 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01103846
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01103846