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Gender, sexuality and the doctrine of detrimental reliance

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References

  1. Court of Appeal, unreported transcript, 21 July 1993.

  2. See, e.g., Katherine O'Donovan,Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfield and Nicholas, 1985); Fran Olsen, “The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform”,Harvard Law Review 96/3 (1983), 1497; Nadine Taub and Elizabeth M. Schneider, “Woman's Subordination and the Role of Law”, in David Kairys, ed.,The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 151.

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  14. Supra n.1, at 1.

  15. Ibid, at 3.

  16. Idem.

  17. Seesupra n.1, at 6–8.

  18. Ibid, at 9.

  19. Ibid, at 19.

  20. Ibid, at 6.

  21. Ibid, at 5.

  22. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1338.

  23. [1986] 1 Ch. 638.

  24. Ibid., at 648.

  25. [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1498.

  26. Ibid., at 1505.

  27. InGreasley v.Cooke, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1306, a woman was held to have acted to her detriment by staying on in a house which she had originally entered as a paid servant, to look after it, her lover and his mentally ill sister unpaid. However, this case is not directly in point because she had been promised only a licence to occupy the house for the rest of her life, not a beneficial interest in it. It was not her lover who was denying the promise, but his relatives who became entitled to the house on his death. Arguably,Hammond v.Mitchell, [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1127, is also an authority for this view. One of the possible explanations of Waite J.'s decision, that Vicky Mitchell had acted to her detriment, is that she had helped with her lover's business activities unpaid. The judgment, however, is not at all clear on this point and this is probably not the most natural interpretation of it. See Anna Lawson, “Acquiring a Beneficial Interest in the Family Home:Hammond v.Mitchell”, The Conveyancer (1992), 218.

  28. Grant v.Edwards, supra n.25, at 648;Coombes v.Smith, [1986] 1 W.L.R. 808, at 820–21;Lloyds Bank v.Rosset, [1991] 1 A.C. 107.

  29. Supra n.1, at 7–8.

  30. Ibid, at 9.

  31. Ibid, at 10.

  32. Ibid, at 6.

  33. Coombes v.Smith, supra n.30, at 820–21per Jonathon Parker Q.C.; cf.Grant v.Edwards, supra n.25, at 648per Nourse L.J. that a woman could be reasonably expected to go and live with her lover were she not to have an interest in his home.

  34. Hammond v.Mitchell, supra n.29.

  35. Eves v.Eves, supra n.24.

  36. Cooke v.Head, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 518.

  37. Grant v.Edwards, supra n.25.

  38. Supra n.24.

  39. Supra n.25.

  40. Supra n.1, at 2.

  41. Idem.

  42. Supra n.25.

  43. See, e.g.Lloyds Bank v.Rosset, supra n.30, at 131.

  44. See, e.g.supra n.27, at 1505.

  45. Grant v.Edwards, supra n.25.

  46. Pascoe v.Turner, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 431.

  47. Eves v.Eves, supra n.24.

  48. Cooke v.Head, supra n.38.

  49. Coombes v.Smith, supra n.30, and cf. Nourse L.J. inGrant v.Edwards, supra n.25, at 648, “[I]n the absence of evidence, the law is not so cynical as to infer that a woman will only go to live with a man to whom she is not married if she understands that she is to have an interest in their home.”

  50. Coombes v.Smith, supra n.30.

  51. Lloyds Bank v.Rossett, supra n.30.

  52. Cooke v.Head, supra n.38. at 519per Denning M.R.; See alsoEves v.Eves, supra n.24, at 1340per Denning M.R. (“... more than many wives ...”).

  53. Lloyds Bank v.Rossett, supra n.30, at 131,per Lord Bridge.

  54. See, e.g., Judith C. Brown, “Lesbian Sexuality in Medieval and Early Modern Europe”, in Martine Duberman, Martha Vicinus and George Chauncey, eds.,Hidden from History (London: Penguin, 1991), 67; Jeffery Weeks,Against Nature (London: Rivers Orm Press, 1991), 68–85.

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  55. Cf. Tinsley v.Milligan, [1993] 3 W.L.R. 126. Though this case concerned a dispute between two formerly cohabiting lesbians, the detrimental reliance issue did not arise because the case was decided on resulting trust principles.

  56. See, generally, Lesbian History Group, Introduction, inNot a Passing Glance: Reclaiming Lesbians in History 1840–1985 (London: Woman's Press, 1989), 1.

  57. Lillian Faderman,Surpassing the Love of Men: Romantic friendship and love between women from the Renaissance to the present (London: Women's Press, 1985)

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  58. Supra n.27.

  59. Mary C. Corley and Hans O. Mauksch, “Registered Nurses, Gender and Commitment”, in Eleanor M. Miller, Hans O. Mauksch, and Anne Stathem, eds.,The Worth of Women's Work: A Qualitative Synthesis (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), 135.

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Flynn, L., Lawson, A. Gender, sexuality and the doctrine of detrimental reliance. Feminist Legal Stud 3, 105–121 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01103683

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