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References
Ludwig von Mises,Human Action (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 885.
I have attempted to show the influence of Keynes's philosophical views on his economics in “Keynes's First Principles,”Dissent on Keynes, Mark Skousen, ed. (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 149–60.
Ludwig von Mises,The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science (Princeton, N. J.: D. van Nostrand, 1962), p. vi.
I consider the German historical school in greater detail inThe Philosophical Origins of Austrian Economics (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1993).
Ludwig von Mises,Theory and History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 4.
Mises,Ultimate Foundation, p. 15.
For an excellent account of Kant's philosophy, see Paul Guyer,Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Admittedly, some “psychologistic” interpretations of Kant put him closer to Mises, but the similarity is no greater than that between Mises and, say, Herbert Spencer.
Mises,Ultimate Foundation, p. 15.
Peter Lipton,Inference to the Best Explanation (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 172–73, discusses the best explanation argument for realism.
Mises presents his evolutionary account as a “speculation.”Ultimate Foundation, p. 15. In my view, evolutionary epistemology suffers from debilitating objections. For important criticisms, see Thomas Nagel,The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) and Ralph Walker,The Coherence Theory of Truth (London: Routledge, 1989).
For Mises's rejection of indeterminism in quantum mechanics, seeTheory and History, pp. 88–89.
Mises,Human Action, p. 39.
Mises,Theory and History, p. 74.
Ibid., p. 77.
Ibid., p. 1.
For an important analysis of Kant's conception of freedom, see “Reason and Autonomy in Grundlegung III” in Onora O'Neill,Constructions of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 51–65.
For the comparison of Mises and Kant, I am indebted to discussion with Ralph Raico.
Mises,Theory and History, p. 13. In support of his view, Mises surprisingly cites Ludwig Feuerbach.
For a full account of the logical positivists, see J. Alberto Coffa,The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the Vienna Station (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Mises,Ultimate Foundation, p. vi.
For a discussion ofad hominem arguments in philosophy, see Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.,Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument (University Park, Penn.: Dialogue Press, 1978), pp. 5–12.
For Popper's “anti-essentialism” see Karl Popper,The Open Society and Its Enemies, 2 vols. (New York: Harper, 1967), pp. 9–21.
Mises,Ultimate Foundation, p. 5.
Mises,Human Action, p. 38.
Mises,Human Action, pp. 64–65.
Ibid., p. 65; footnote number omitted.
Ibid., p. 66.
These remarks should not be taken as a defense of positivism. In my own view, the verifiability criterion ought to be rejected; further discussion is in myPhilosophical Origins, pp. 36 ff. Rather, I am here addressing the question: if one did accept the verifiability criterion, how much of Austrian economics could be retained?
Mises,Human Action, pp. 32–33; footnote number omitted.
Mises,Theory and History, p. 13.
Ibid., p. 36, n. 1. Brentano's views are presented in hisThe Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, R. M. Chisholm and Elizabeth Schneewind, trans. (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1969). An interesting discussion of Brentano on value judgments may be found in Thomas L. Carson,The Status of Morality (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1984).
Mises,Theory and History, p. 63.
Ludwig von Mises,Socialism (London: Jonathan Cape, [1936] 1951), p. 430.
Mises,Theory and History, pp. 299 ff. Strauss's argument is in hisNatural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 50 ff.
R. M. Hare, “Reductio ad Absurdum of Descriptivism” in hisEssays in Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 122: Philippa Foot's side of the argument is in herVirtures and Vices (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978). For Anscombe, see her “Modern Moral Philosophy” inCollected Philosophical Papers (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), vol. 3, pp. 26–42.
Mises,Human Action, p. 100. The passage criticizes Edmund Husserl as well as Bergson. I have not discussed the patently absurd claim that Mises was a phenomenologist.
Ludwig von Mises,Epistemological Problems of Economics (New York: New York University Press, 1981), p. 46; footnote number omitted.
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This paper was prepared for consideration for a Ludwig von Mises prize that was awared at the Mises Institute's 10th anniversary conference, October 9–11, 1992. I am grateful to Pat Heckman and Ralph Raico for their very helpful suggestions.
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Gordon, D. The philosophical contributions of Ludwig von Mises. Rev Austrian Econ 7, 95–106 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01102137
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01102137