The Review of Austrian Economics

, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp 31–65 | Cite as

The theory of the firm: The Austrians as precursors and critics of contemporary theory

  • Nicolai Juul Foss


In the above, I have taken the theme of Austrian economics and economic organization through several variations. I hope to have taken steps towards establishing that not only were the Austrians important precursors of the contemporary theory of economic organization, but they may also contribute to existing theory as well as provide their distinctive perspective on economic organization. Space limitations have dictated, however, that I have been able to only scratch the surface. Assuredly, there is much more to be done on all the three themes I have been discussing, particularly on the last, constructive one.


Public Finance Space Limitation Austrian Economic Economic Organization Important Precursor 
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Copyright information

© The Ludwig von Mises Institute 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nicolai Juul Foss
    • 1
  1. 1.the Institute of Industrial Economics and Strategy at the Copenhagen Business SchoolDenmark

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