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A note on the prisoner's dilemma

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Abstract

This paper clarifies some basic concepts or assumptions of the prisoner's dilemma, asserts the independence between the two agentsA andB, and advocates the application of the dominance principle of decision theory to the prisoner's dilemma. It discusses several versions of the prisoner's dilemma, including the one-shot and repeated cases of a noncooperative game from a purely egoistic point of view. The main part of this paper, however, is a study of the problem from a moral point of view through a special decision-theoretic approach. Morality is taken into account by incorporating the utility of the feeling of moral satisfaction for the agent, as a part of the total utility for the agent, into the decision-theoretic model. In this way the problem will appear as a purely technical decision problem, and the conflicts between various assumptions, or the dilemma caused by the problem, will no longer exist. It is also pointed out that in a more general case, for some values of the coefficient of moralityk, dominance will not exist so that the dominance principle will not be applicable.

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Sheng, C.L. A note on the prisoner's dilemma. Theor Decis 36, 233–246 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01079929

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01079929

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