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The judicial doctrine of mandate

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References

  1. [1987] 3 All E.R. 671.

  2. O. Hood Phillips,Constitutional and Administrative Law, Sweet and Maxwell, 7th Ed., 1986, 56; C. Turpin,British Government and the Constitution, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985, 442, 444; S.A. de Smith,Constitutional and Administrative Law, Penguin Education, 5th ed., 1985, 105; D. Oliver, “The Parties and Parliament; Representative or Intraparty Democracy?”, inThe Changing Constitution (ed. J. Jowell and D. Oliver) Clarendon Press, 1985, 103 at 113, 114.

  3. I. Crewe, “The Labour Party and the Electorate”, inThe Politics of the Labour Party (ed. D. Kavanagh), Allen and Unwin, 1982, 26–38.

  4. de Smith,supra n.2 at 105;Bromley L.B.C. v. G.L.C. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 62 at 69per Denning M.R.

  5. For examples, see Oliver,supra n.2 at 115.

  6. Hood Phillips,supra n.2 at 56.

  7. For the doctrine and the principle of limited government, see C. Harlow, “Power from the People? Representation and Constitutional Theory”, inLaw Legitimacy and the Constitution (ed. P. McAuslan and J.F. McEldowney), Sweet and Maxwell, 1985.

  8. D. Oliver,supra n.2 at 116.

  9. A.V.. Dicey,Law and Constitution, 10th ed., MacMillan, 1959, 74.

  10. I. Jennings,The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed., University of London Press, 1958, 176–179; de Smith,supra n.2 at 105.

  11. For the unenforceable character of convention, in courts of law, see, for example, C.R. Munro,Studies in Constitutional Law, Butterworths, 1987, 44–48; for the idea in Dicey, seesupra n.9 at 24; for a different view based on some recent cases, see N. Doe, “Non-Legal Rules and the Courts: Enforceability”, 9Liverpool Law Review (1987), 173–188.

  12. [1971] 22 P & CR 718 at 726per Thesiger J.

  13. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 62 at 107.

  14. [1976] 3 All E.R. 665 at 684–684; see alsoinfra n.19.

  15. [1977] 2 All E.R. 182 at 195, 196.

  16. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 62 at 93, see alsoStorer v.Manchester C.C. [1974] 3 All E.R. 824, C.A.;Gibson v.Manchester C.C. [1978] 2 All E.R. 583, C.A. (compare the H.L. decision, [1979] 1 All E.R. 972);Norwich C.C. v.Secretary of State for the Environment [1982] 1 All E.R. 737.

  17. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 62 at 107; the idea that a local authority owes a fiduciary duty to its ratepayers is not new: seeRoberts v.Hopwood [1925] A.C. 578;Prescott v.Birmingham Corporation [1955] Ch. 210.

  18. “The rigid adoption of a policy simply as a matter of political commitment to a section of the electorate ... demonstrates a breach of fiduciary duty”,per Oliver LJ in the Court of Appeal: [1982] 2 W.L.R. 62, 84.

  19. Ibid. at 107; for Lord Brandon, see 129: “It is ... entirely wrong for such a majority to regard themselves as bound to exercise their discretion ... in accordance with their election promises”.

  20. [1976] 3 All E.R. 665 at 684–685.

  21. P.P. Craig,Administrative Law, Sweet and Maxwell, 1983, 376, 377; D. Foulkes,Administrative Law, 6th Ed., Butterworths, 1986, 181;Stringer v.Minister of Housing [1971] 1 All E.R. 65;British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v.Minister of Technology [1971] A.C. 610;Sagnata Investments Ltd. v.Norwich Corporation [1971] 2 Q.B. 614.

  22. See General Rate Act 1967, s.1; by s.99 and para 39(1) of Sch. 12 to the Local Government Act 1972, “all questions coming or arising before a local authority shall be decided by a majorityof the members of the authority present and voting.”

  23. For the view that the judiciary favours Conservative over Labour manifestos, see P. McAuslan, “Administrative Law, Collective Consumption and Judicial Policy”, 46Modern Law Review (1983), 1 at 14–15.Waltham Forest raises some doubts about this view; the idea of fettering of discretion would, of course, be irrelevant were the doctrine of mandate to be used to try and limit the use of legislative power by Parliament: the principle of Sovereignty would forbid this.

  24. For breach of fiduciary duty, seesupra nn.17, 18; for change in circumstance, see Lord Diplock inBromley, supra n.2 at 107; for the rule of law, see Oliver,supra n.2 at 116.

  25. [1982] 2 W.L.R. 62 at 69–70; for a rare theoretical interpretation ofBromley as being in substance about the fettering of discretion, see H.W.R. Wade,Administrative Law, 5th ed., Clarendon Press, 1982, 331: here he relies on Lord Brandon's vague allusion to it at [1982] 2 W.L.R. 129; none of the standard fettering cases, mentioned above in n.21, were cited in the earlier cases.

  26. [1987] 3 All E.R. 671 at 677.

  27. Ibid.

  28. Ibid. at 676.

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  1. University of Wales, UK

    Norman Doe LL.M. (Wales), Ph.D. (Cantab) (Barrister-at-Law, Lecturer in Law, Cardiff Law School)

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  1. Norman Doe LL.M. (Wales), Ph.D. (Cantab)
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Doe, N. The judicial doctrine of mandate. Liverpool Law Rev 11, 89–98 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01079639

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