Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

, Volume 7, Issue 3, pp 311–324 | Cite as

On a lottery pricing anomaly: Time tells the tale

  • Nathaniel T. Wilcox


This article identifies a lottery pricing anomaly, which I call the “r=x anomaly,” that is present in past pricing experiments—namely, a tendency for subjects to announce that their minimum selling price for some binary lottery is the greater of the two lottery prizes. The study shows that the anomaly is inconsistent with two theoretical explanations for another well-known pricing anomaly (preference reversal) and experimentally replicates these inconsistencies. The new experiment also measures the time subjects spend making their pricing decisions. These decision-time measurements suggest that ther=x anomaly may be a decision-cost effect.

Key words

anomalies decision cost experimental methods nonlinear models nontransitive models 

JEL classification numbers

C91 D81 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nathaniel T. Wilcox
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of HoustonHouston

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