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Theory and Decision

, Volume 36, Issue 2, pp 163–185 | Cite as

Focal points in pure coordination games: An experimental investigation

  • Judith Mehta
  • Chris Starmer
  • Robert Sugden
Article

Abstract

This paper reports an experimental investigation of the hypothesis that in coordination games, players draw on shared concepts of salience to identify ‘focal points’ on which they can coordinate. The experiment involves games in which equilibria can be distinguished from one another only in terms of the way strategies are labelled. The games are designed to test a number of specific hypotheses about the determinants of salience. These hypotheses are generally confirmed by the results of the experiment.

Keywords

Common knowledge multiple equilibria focal points salience coordination games 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Judith Mehta
    • 1
  • Chris Starmer
    • 1
  • Robert Sugden
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Economic and Social StudiesUniversity of East AngliaNorwichUK

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