Abstract
Conditions are defined under the majority voting procedure under which manipulation does no harm to a majority, and when a majority benefit. The effect of introducing interpersonal comparability on the desirability of manipulation is discussed under Rawlsian justice and with preference intensities.
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Macintyre, I.D.A. Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict. Theor Decis 35, 167–177 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01074957
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01074957