An exposition and development of the debate on the nature of the distinction between appropriate and inappropriate beliefs in rational-emotive therapy

Abstract

After accounting for the theoretical and clinical significance attaching to the distinction between appropriate and inappropriate beliefs in Rational-emotive therapy, discrepancy, ambiguity, and confusion concerning the nature (quantitative or qualitative) of this distinction is reported and illustrated with examples from the literature. There then follows a discussion of the merits and demerits of the quantitative and qualitative schools of thought in the context of the philosophical ethos of rational-emotive theory. The writer reports on his own clinical observations and, on the basis of these clinical observations together with the aforegoing theoretical considerations, expresses his own preferred viewpoint. By way of illustration, a transcript of the writer's exposition of this theoretical viewpoint, taken from one of his own therapy sessions, is offered, after which a brief attempt is made to account for the survival of the opposing position. The paper concludes by urging rational-emotive therapists to experiment responsibly with these differing approaches and to report back to the profession with their clinical observations and theoretical comments.