Abstract
Certain linguistic structures imply speakers' beliefs about their utterances. Factuals imply that the speaker's hypothesis matches observed data; counterfactuals suggest that hypotheses and observations differ, and uncertainty implies that unclear observations make many hypotheses tenable. We examined how age(11-and 16-year-olds and college students) and syntactic structure (subordinating conjunctions, cognitive verbs, and verb modifications) affect the ability to specify the hypothetical and observational referents of expressions of factual, counterfactual, and uncertainty beliefs. There was considerable linguistic growth during adolescence. College students outperformed the younger students. Age differences were most pronounced on judging the hypothetical referents of counterfactuals and uncertainty structures. The two precollege groups often misinterpreted counterfactuals and uncertainty structures because they equated hypotheses with observations. They seldom understood that uncertainty meant that more than one hypothesis could account for observations. Verb modifications were easier to interpret than cognitive verbs, and subordinating conjunctions were hardest. Factuals were easier than counterfactuals and uncertainty structures.
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Wing, C.S., Scholnick, E.K. Understanding the language of reasoning: Cognitive, linguistic, and developmental influences. J Psycholinguist Res 15, 383–401 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01067721
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01067721