Abstract
Laffont and Tirole (1987) analyzed the problem of a regulator that wants to select one ofn firms to carry out a single indivisible project when the firms have private and independent costs and have the possibility of an ex-post investment in (non-observable) effort to reduce the (observable) cost.
This paper generalizes the analysis to a model of common costs, unknown at the bidding stage, while keeping the assumption of independent types. I show that the main characteristics of the private costs model are kept in a common cost framework. I provide two mechanisms that may be used to implement the optimal contract.
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This is a much revised version of a part of chapter one of my Ph.D. dissertation. I would like to thank Drew Fudenberg, Oliver Hart, and two anonymous referees for their comments. I am especially indebted to Jean Tirole, who suggested this problem to me. I have also benefited from presentations at MIT and the EARIE 93 Meeting. Financial support from INVOTAN (grant 3/88/PO) is gratefully acknowledged. Remaining errors are my own.
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Branco, F. Auctioning incentive contracts: The common cost, independent types case. J Regul Econ 7, 277–292 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01067098
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01067098