Abstract
Moral hazard complicates the design of an optimal benefit structure in a regulated social insurance program such as workers' compensation. We discuss the type of empirical information necessary to set optimal benefit levels in the presence of moral hazard. Since we present trends in indemnity and medical expenditures that indicate the presence of “claims rate moral hazard,” we develop and estimate a model of this type of moral hazard. We find evidence of moral hazard effects that are roughly consistent with those found elsewhere in the literature. We also present the first direct estimates of the impact of benefits on the output of the firm. We find that an increase in real benefits significantly decreases the output of the firm. This is consistent with notion that higher benefits induce more jobless spells and increase production costs using skilled labor. We close by illustrating how these estimates can be used to provide information on the feasible benefit schedule, given the presence of moral hazard.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bartel, Ann, and Lacey Glen Thomas. 1982. OSHA Enforcement, Industrial Compliance and Workforce Injuries. Research paper #477a, Columbia University Graduate School of Business.
Butler, Richard J. 1983. “Wage and Injury Rate Response to Shifting Levels of Workers Compensation.” InSafety and the Work Force: Incentives and Disincentives in Workers' Compensation, edited by John D. Worrall. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
Butler, Richard J. and David Appel. 1990. “Benefit Increases in Workers' Compensation.”Southern Economic Journal 56:594–606.
Butler, Richard J. and John D. Worrall. 1983. “Workers' Compensation: Benefit and Injury Claim Rates in the Seventies.”Review of Economics and Statistics 65: 580–589.
Butler, Richard J. and John D. Worrall. 1985. “Work Injury Compensation and the Duration of Nonwork Spells.”Economic Journal 95: 714–724.
Butler, Richard J. and John D. Worrall. 1992. “Self Insurance in Workers' Compensation.” InEconomic Issues in Workers Compensation, edited by David Durbin. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Butler, Richard J. and John D. Worrall. 1991. “Claims Reporting and Risk Bearing Moral Hazard in Workers Compensation.”Journal of Risk and Insurance 53:191–204.
Chelius, James R. 1977.Workplace Safety and Health. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.
Chelius, James R. 1982. “The Influence of Workers Compensation on Safety Incentives.”Industrial and Labor Relations Review 35: 235–242.
Chelius, James R. 1983. “Workers Compensation and the Incentive to Prevent Injuries.” InSafety and the Workforce: Incentives and Disincentives in Workers' Compensation, edited by John D. Worrall. Ithaca, NY:ILR Press.
Chelius, James R. and Robert S. Smith. 1983. “Experience Rating and Injury Prevention.” InSafety and the Work Force: Incentives and Disincentives in Workers Compensation, edited by John D. Worrall. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
Darling-Hammond, Linda and Thomas J. Kniesner. 1980.The Law and Economics of Workers Compensation, Santa Monica, Ca: Rand Corporation.
Heckman, James J. 1979. “Sample Selection as a Specification Error.”Econometrica. (January): 153–161.
Johnson, William G. 1983. “Work Disincentives of Benefit Payments.” InSafety and the Work Force: Incentives and Disincentives in Workers Compensation, edited by John D. Worrall. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
Kniesner, Thomas J. and John D. Leeth. 1989. “Separating the Reporting Effects from the Injury Rate Effects of Workers Compensation Insurance: A Hedonic Simulation.”Industrial and Labor Relations Review 42: 280–293.
Krueger, Alan B. 1990. “Incentive Effects of Workers' Compensation Insurance.”Journal of Public Economics (February) 41: 73–99.
Leigh, J. Paul. 1985. “Analysis of Workers' Compensation Laws Using Data on Individuals.”Industrial Relations 24: 247–256.
Moore, Michael J. and W. Kip Viscusi. 1989. “Promoting Safety through Workers' Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wage Costs of Injury Insurance.”Rand Journal of Economics (Winter) 20:499–515; also in Chapter 4 of Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi. 1990.Compensation Mechanisms for Job Risks: Wages, Workers' Compensation, and Product Liability. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Oi, Walter Y. 1974. “On the Economics of Industrial Safety.”Law and Contempary Problems 38: 669–699.
Ruser, John W. 1985. “Workers' Compensation Insurance, Experience Rating, and Occupational Injuries.”Rand Journal of Economics 16: 487–503.
Ruser, John W. 1991a. “Workers' Compensation and Occupational Injuries and Illnesses.”Journal of Labor Economics (4) 9: 325–350.
Ruser, John W. 1991b. “Workers Compensation and the Distribution of Occupational Injuries.” BLS Working Paper 211. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Ruser, John W. 1990. “The Impact of Workers' Compensation Insurance on Occupational Injuries and Fatalities: Reporting Effects and True Safety Effects.” Unpublished manuscript Washington, D.C.: Office of Economic Research, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Worrall, John D. and David Appel. 1982. “The Wage Replacement Rate and Benefit Utilization in Workers' Compensation Insurance.”Journal of Risk and Insurance 49: 361–371.
Worrall, John D. and David Appel. 1985. “Some Benefit Issues in Workers' Compensation.” InWorkers' Compensation Benefits: Adequacy, Equity, and Efficiency, edited by John D. Worrall and David Appel. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
Worrall, John D. and Richard J. Butler. 1990. “Heterogeneity Bias in the Estimation of the Determinants of Workers' Compensation Loss Distributions.” InBenefits, Costs, and Cycles in Workers' Compensation, edited by Philip S. Borba and David Appel. Boston, Ma: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Butler, R.J., Worrall, J.D. Workers' compensation: Determining a feasible payment structure in a regulatory environment. J Regul Econ 5, 65–78 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01066314
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01066314