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Implications for unisex statutes and risk-pooling: The costs of gender and underwriting attributes in the automobile insurance market

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Abstract

In this paper, we explore the effects of gender and other demographic features and benefit provisions on insurance premiums using individual data from a property and liability insurer domiciled in Georgia for three types of automobile insurance coverages: collision insurance, comprehensive insurance, and liability insurance. We report the implicit prices of individual and automobile underwriting attributes and find that the effect of gender on the insurance premium for each of our coverage types is significant but has a lower absolute effect than other underwriting attributes, raising questions about the regulatory impact of unisex statutes. Finally, we examine three alternatives open to the regulator who must mandate and monitor insurance pricing under a unisex statute.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, 75275-4099, Dallas, TX

    Robert Puelz

  2. Department of Economics, Fogelman College of Business and Economics, Memphis State University, 38152, Memphis, TN

    Walter Kemmsies

Authors
  1. Robert Puelz
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  2. Walter Kemmsies
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Puelz, R., Kemmsies, W. Implications for unisex statutes and risk-pooling: The costs of gender and underwriting attributes in the automobile insurance market. J Regul Econ 5, 289–301 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01065955

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