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An optimal tax/subsidy for output and pollution control under asymmetric information in oligopoly markets

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Abstract

This paper constructs an optimal incentive tax/subsidy scheme in an oligopoly market with pollution, as a generalization of the Loeb-Magat scheme, which is nondiscriminatory and requires less information for implementation than the conventional ones. Some interesting properties of the scheme are discussed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Management and Policy, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, 373-1 Kusong-dong, Yusong-gu, 305-701, Taejon, Korea

    Jae-Cheol Kim & Ki-Bok Chang

Authors
  1. Jae-Cheol Kim
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  2. Ki-Bok Chang
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Kim, JC., Chang, KB. An optimal tax/subsidy for output and pollution control under asymmetric information in oligopoly markets. J Regul Econ 5, 183–197 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01065365

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01065365

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