Abstract
It is argued that we need a richer version of Bayesian decision theory, admitting both subjective and objective probabilities and providing rational criteria for choice of our prior probabilities. We also need a theory of tentative acceptance of empirical hypotheses. There is a discussion of subjective and of objective probabilities and of the relationship between them, as well as a discussion of the criteria used in choosing our prior probabilities, such as the principles of indifference and of maximum entropy, and the simplicity ranking of alternative hypotheses.
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Harsanyi, J.C. Bayesian decision theory, subjective and objective probabilities, and acceptance of empirical hypotheses. Synthese 57, 341–365 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064702
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064702