Skip to main content
Log in

An objective theory of statistical testing

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Theories of statistical testing may be seen as attempts to provide systematic means for evaluating scientific conjectures on the basis of incomplete or inaccurate observational data. The Neyman-Pearson Theory of Testing (NPT) has purported to provide an objective means for testing statistical hypotheses corresponding to scientific claims. Despite their widespread use in science, methods of NPT have themselves been accused of failing to be objective; and the purported objectivity of scientific claims based upon NPT has been called into question. The purpose of this paper is first to clarify this question by examining the conceptions of (I) the function served by NPT in science, and (II) the requirements of an objective theory of statistics upon which attacks on NPT's objectivity are based. Our grounds for rejecting these conceptions suggest altered conceptions of (I) and (II) that might avoid such attacks. Second, we propose a reformulation of NPT, denoted by NPT*, based on these altered conceptions, and argue that it provides an objective theory of statistics. The crux of our argument is that by being able to objectively control error frequencies NPT* is able to objectively evaluate what has or has not been learned from the result of a statistical test.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Birnbaum, A.: 1977, ‘The Neyman-Pearson Theory as Decision Theory, and as Inference Theory; With a Criticism of the Lindley-Savage Argument for Bayesian Theory’,Synthese 36, 19–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap, R.: 1950,Logical Foundations of Probability, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dempster, A. P.: 1971, ‘Model Searching and Estimation in the Logic of Inference’, in V. P. Godambe and D. A. Sprott (eds.),Foundations of Statistical Inference, Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, Toronto, 56–77.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edwards, A. W. F.: 1971, ‘Science, Statistics and Society’,Nature 233, 17–19.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fetzer, J. H.: 1981,Scientific Knowledge, Reidel, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fisher, R. A.: 1955, ‘Statistical Methods and Scientific Induction’,Journal of the Royal Statistical Society (B)17, 69–78.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere, R. N.: 1976, ‘Empirical Probability, Objective Statistical Methods and Scientific Inquiry’, in W. L. Harper and C. A. Hooker (eds.),Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference and Statistical Theories of Science, Vol. II, Reidel, Dordrecht, 63–101.

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere, R. N.: 1977, ‘Testing vs. Information Models of Statistical Inference’, in R. G. Colodny (ed.),Logic Laws and Life, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 19–70.

    Google Scholar 

  • Good, I. J.: 1976, ‘The Bayesian Influence, or How to Sweep Subjectivism Under the Carpet’, in W. L. Harper and C. A. Hooker (eds.),Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference and Statistical Theories of Science, Vol. II, Reidel, Dordrecht, 125–174.

    Google Scholar 

  • Good, I. J.: 1981, ‘Some Logic and History of Hypothesis Testing’, in J. C. Pitt (ed.),Philosophy in Economics, Reidel, Dordrecht, 149–174.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, I.: 1965,Logic of Statistical Inference, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, I.: 1980, ‘The Theory of Probable Inference: Neyman, Peirce and Braithwaite’, in D. H. Mellor (ed.),Science, Belief and Behavior: Essays in Honor of R. B. Braithwaite, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 141–160.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kalbfleisch, J. G.: 1979,Probability and Statistical Inference, Vol. II, Springer-Verlag, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kempthorne, O. and Folks, L.: 1971, ‘Probability, Statistics, and Data Analysis’, Iowa State University Press, Ames.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kyburg, H. E. Jr.: 1971, ‘Probability and Informative Inference’, in V. P. Godambe and D. A. Sprott (eds.),Foundations of Statistical Inference, Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, Toronto, 82–103.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kyburg, H. E. Jr.: 1974,The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference, Reidel, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lehmann, E. L.: 1959,Testing Statistical Hypotheses, John Wiley, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levi, I.: 1980,The Enterprise of Knowledge, MIT Press, Cambridge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindley, D. V.: 1976, ‘Bayesian Statistics’, in W. L. Harper and C. A. Hooker (eds.),Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference and Statistical Theories of Science, Vol. II, Reidel, Dordrecht, 353–363.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayo, D.: 1981a, ‘In Defense of the Neyman-Pearson Theory of Confidence Intervals’,Philosophy of Science 48, 269–280.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayo, D.: 1981b, ‘Testing Statistical Testing’, in J. C. Pitt (ed.),Philosophy in Economics, Reidel, Dordrecht, 175–203.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayo, D.: 1982, ‘On After-Trial Criticisms of Neyman-Pearson Theory of Statistics’, in P. Asquith (ed.),PSA 1982, Vol. 1, East Lansing Philosophy of Science Association, 145–158.

  • Neyman, J.: 1950,First Course in Probability and Statistics, Henry Holt, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neyman, J.: 1971, Comments on R. M. Royall, ‘Linear Regression Models in Finite Population Sampling Theory’, in V. P. Godambe and D. A. Sprott (eds.),Foundations of Statistical Inference, Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, Toronto, 276–278.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neyman, J. and Pearson, E. S.: 1933, ‘On the Problem of the Most Efficient Tests of Statistical Hypotheses’, inPhilosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 231, 289–337. (As reprinted inJoint Statistical Papers, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967, 276–283.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Neyman, J. and Pearson, E. S.: 1936, ‘Contributions to the Theory of Testing Statistical Hypotheses’,Statistical Research Memoirs 1, 1–37. (As reprinted inJoint Statistical Papers, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967, 203–239.)

    Google Scholar 

  • Pearson, E. S.: 1955, ‘Statistical Concepts in Their Relation to Reality’,Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B,17, 204–207.

    Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. R.: 1972,Objective Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosenkrantz, R. D.: 1977,Inference, Method and Decision, Reidel, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rubin, H.: 1971, ‘Occam's Razor Needs New Blades’, in V. P. Godambe and D. A. Sprott (eds.),Foundations of Statistical Inference, 372–374.

  • Savage, L.: 1954,The Foundations of Statistics, Wiley & Sons, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheffler, I.: 1967,Science and Subjectivity, Bobbs-Merrill, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Seidenfeld, T.: 1979,Philosophical Problems of Statistical Inference, Reidel, Dordrecht.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sokal, R. R. and Hunter, P. E.: 1955, ‘A Morphometric Analysis of DDT-Resistant and Non-Resistant Housefly Strains’,Annals of the Entomology Society of America 48, 499–507.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sokal, R. R. and Rohlf, F. J.: 1969,Biometry, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spielman, S.: 1972, ‘A Reflection on the Neyman-Pearson Theory of Testing’,British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24, 201–222.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

I would like to thank Ronald Giere for very useful comments and numerous valuable conversations concerning this paper and his own work. This research was carried out during tenure of a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship; I gratefully acknowledge this support.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Mayo, D.G. An objective theory of statistical testing. Synthese 57, 297–340 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064701

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064701

Keywords

Navigation