Skip to main content

On some worldly worries

Abstract

Israel Scheffler and others have had trouble accepting such drastic theses in my work as that worlds, even old ones, are made by right versions, even new ones, and that two conflicting versions may both be right. But further explication shows how such theses have advantages over the more usual common-sense alternatives.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Published by the author at Emerson Hall, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138, U.S.A., on 1 September 1988.

NOTICE: This paper may be copied and circulated with due credit but without charge. (It was accepted by theJournal of Philosophy, but withdrawn by that journal on the eve of publication because of a dispute over rights.)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Goodman, N. On some worldly worries. Synthese 95, 9–12 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064664

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064664