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Self-selecting tariffs under pure preferences among tariffs

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Abstract

The behavioral assumptions for welfare analysis of self-selecting tariffs are generalized to be consistent with those maintained in empirical models of tariff choice. When customers have pure preferences among tariffs, it is shown that the optimal self-selecting tariffs provide strictly greater welfare than mandatory marginal cost prices, contain marginal prices that do not equal marginal cost, and can Pareto dominate an existing tariff. As an illustration of the theoretical results, optimal self-selecting tariffs are calculated empirically for a local telephone company.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of California at Berkeley, 94720, Berkeley, CA

    Kenneth E. Train

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  1. Kenneth E. Train
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Train, K.E. Self-selecting tariffs under pure preferences among tariffs. J Regul Econ 6, 247–264 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064654

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064654

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