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The curious case of the Chinese gym

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Abstract

Searle has recently used two adaptations of his Chinese room argument in an attack on connectionism. I show that these new forms of the argument are fallacious. First I give an exposition of and rebuttal to the original Chinese room argument, and then a brief introduction to the essentials of connectionism.

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Copeland, B.J. The curious case of the Chinese gym. Synthese 95, 173–186 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064587

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064587

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