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Gender, politics, and the theoretical virtues

Abstract

Traits like simplicity and explanatory power have traditionally been treated as values internal to the sciences, constitutive rather than contextual. As such they are cognitive virtues. This essay contrasts a traditional set of such virtues with a set of alternative virtues drawn from feminist writings about the sciences. In certain theoretical contexts, the only reasons for preferring a traditional or an alternative virtue are socio-political. This undermines the notion that the traditional virtues can be considered purely cognitive.

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I am grateful to participants in the Indiana University Workshop on Social Values in the Context of Justification for their comments on an earlier, spoken, version of this paper.

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Longino, H.E. Gender, politics, and the theoretical virtues. Synthese 104, 383–397 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064506

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064506

Keywords

  • Explanatory Power
  • Theoretical Context
  • Theoretical Virtue
  • Feminist Writing
  • Traditional Virtue