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Epistemic normativity

Abstract

This paper examines the source and content of epistemic norms. In virtue of what is it that epistemic norms have their normative force? A semantic approach to this question, due to Alvin Goldman, is examined and found unacceptable. Instead, accounts seeking to ground epistemic norms in our desires are argued to be most promising. All of these accounts make epistemic norms a variety of hypothetical imperative. It is argued that such an account may be offered, grounding our epistemic norms in desire, which nevertheless makes these imperatives universal. The account is contrasted with some recent work of Stephen Stich.

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I am indebted to Derk Pereboom, Lynne Baker, George Sher, William Talbott, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on a previous draft. David Christensen provided me with advice which resulted in major changes in the structure of the argument here; I am especially indebted to him. In addition, I received helpful comments from audiences at Concordia University, SUNY at Albany, and the 1991 Western Division meeting of the A.P.A. After this paper was written, Alvin Goldman sent me a draft of his (1991). There is a good deal of overlap between what Goldman has to say about Stich and Section 4 above.

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Kornblith, H. Epistemic normativity. Synthese 94, 357–376 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064485

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Keywords

  • Recent Work
  • Normative Force
  • Epistemic Norm
  • Semantic Approach
  • Hypothetical Imperative