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I have had a great deal of help on this paper from Ellery Eells, Clark Glymour, Christopher Hitchcock, Kevin Kelly, Jonathan Pressler, Wesley Salmon, Julius Sensat, Elliott Sober, and especially Teddy Seidenfeld and Herbert Simon. Lively audiences at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and anonymous referees also provided useful criticism. This research was financed by the National Endowment for the Humanities (Grant #FT-27957-86) and by the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation. Section 5 of this paper reworks pages 44–47 of my ‘Causal and Explanatory Asymmetry’ (1982).
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Hausman, D.M. Why don't effects explain their causes?. Synthese 94, 227–244 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064339
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064339