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A problem for information theoretic semantics

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Abstract

Information theoretic semantics proposes to construe predicate reference in terms of nomological relations between distal properties and properties of representational mental events. Research on the model has largely concentrated on the problem of choosing the nomological relation in terms of which distal properties are to be singled out. I argue that, in addition to this, an information theoretic account has to provide a specification of which properties of representational mental events will play a role in determining reference,qua bearers of nomological relations. I contend that this task poses a serious additional challenge to the viability of the model.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, B15 2TT, Edgbaston, Birmingham, England

    José L. Zalabardo

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  1. José L. Zalabardo
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I am indebted to Paul Boghossian, Allan Gibbard, Eric Lormand, Peter Railton, Gideon Rosen, Crispin Wright, and Steve Yablo for their comments on drafts of this paper.

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Zalabardo, J.L. A problem for information theoretic semantics. Synthese 105, 1–29 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064101

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