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Constrained maximization reconsidered — An elaboration and critique of Gauthier's modelling of rational cooperation in a single prisoner's dilemma

Abstract

Gauthier's argument for constrained maximization, presented inMorals by Agreement, is perfected by taking into account the possibility of accidental exploitation and discussing the limitations on the values of the parameters which measure the translucency of the actors. Gauthier's argument is nevertheless shown to be defective concerning the rationality of constrained maximization as a strategic choice. It can be argued that it applies only to a single actor entering a population of individuals who are themselves not rational actors but simple rule-followers. A proper analysis of the strategic choice situation involving two rational actors who confront each other shows that constrained maximization as the choice of both actors can only result under very demanding assumptions.

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Franssen, M. Constrained maximization reconsidered — An elaboration and critique of Gauthier's modelling of rational cooperation in a single prisoner's dilemma. Synthese 101, 249–272 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064019

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01064019

Keywords

  • Rational Actor
  • Single Actor
  • Strategic Choice
  • Choice Situation
  • Proper Analysis