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Putting inference to the best explanation in its place

Abstract

This paper discusses the nature and the status of inference to the best explanation (IBE). We (1) outline the foundational role given IBE by its defenders and the arguments of critics who deny it any place at all; (2) argue that, on the two main conceptions of explanation, IBE cannot be a foundational inference rule; (3) sketch an account of IBE that makes it contextual and dependent on substantive empirical assumptions, much as simplicity seems to be; (4) show how that account avoids the critics' complaints and leaves IBE an important role; and (5) sketch how our account can clarify debates over IBE in arguments for scientific realism.

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The general line of argumentation developed in this paper owes much to the most recent work of Elliot Sober on simplicity and confirmation; we want to acknowledge that dependence directly. Since writing this paper, we have also come across Yemima Ben-Menahem: 1990, ‘The Inference to the Best Explanation’,Erkenntnis 33, 319–44, whose general approach parallels our own. Helpful comments were made on earlier drafts by George Graham, Romane Clark, Yemima Ben-Menahem, and an anonymous referee.

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Day, T., Kincaid, H. Putting inference to the best explanation in its place. Synthese 98, 271–295 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063944

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063944

Keywords

  • Good Explanation
  • Inference Rule
  • Main Conception
  • Scientific Realism
  • Empirical Assumption