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Propositional attitudes and formal ontology

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Abstract

This paper develops — within an axiomatic theory of properties, relations, and propositions which accords them well-defined existence and identity conditions — a sententialist-functionalist account of belief as a symbolically mediated relation to a special kind of propositional entity, theproxy-encoding abstract proposition. It is then shown how, in terms of this account, the truth conditions of English belief reports may be captured in a formally precise and empirically adequate way that accords genuinely semantic status to familiar opacity data.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University, 43210, Columbus, OH, U.S.A.

    Steven E. Boër

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  1. Steven E. Boër
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I am deeply indebted to Edward Zalta for many helpful comments and suggestions.

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Boër, S.E. Propositional attitudes and formal ontology. Synthese 98, 187–242 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063942

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