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The context principle and Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of types

Abstract

In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.

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I would like to thank Michael Wrigley (UNICAMP) and Gottfried Gabriel (Universität Konstanz) as well as an anonymous journal referee for their valuable comments on a previous version of this paper.

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Ruffino, M.A. The context principle and Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of types. Synthese 98, 401–414 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063927

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063927

Keywords

  • Good Reason
  • Context Principle
  • Syntactical Version