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Classical harmony: Rules of inference and the meaning of the logical constants

Abstract

The thesis that, in a system of natural deduction, the meaning of a logical constant is given by some or all of its introduction and elimination rules has been developed recently in the work of Dummett, Prawitz, Tennant, and others, by the addition of harmony constraints. Introduction and elimination rules for a logical constant must be in harmony. By deploying harmony constraints, these authors have arrived at logics no stronger than intuitionist propositional logic. Classical logic, they maintain, cannot be justified from this proof-theoretic perspective. This paper argues that, while classical logic can be formulated so as to satisfy a number of harmony constraints, the meanings of the standard logical constants cannot all be given by their introduction and/or elimination rules; negation, in particular, comes under close scrutiny.

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Milne, P. Classical harmony: Rules of inference and the meaning of the logical constants. Synthese 100, 49–94 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063921

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01063921

Keywords

  • Classical Logic
  • Propositional Logic
  • Natural Deduction
  • Logical Constant
  • Elimination Rule