Impact of regulation on demand side conservation programs

Abstract

This paper reviews critically the economics of utility demand-side conservation programs under different regulatory regimes introducing a service-oriented framework in order to derive simultaneously the demand for electricity and for efficiency. This framework establishes a relation between engineering efficiency improvements, the rebound effect (i.e., more efficient appliances tend to increase the service demand), and actual conservation. Price-cap regulation, which is consistent with least cost planning (LCP), leads to the necessary condition for (profitable) DSM that the price cap does not cover the marginal costs of supplying electricity. The difference between the marginal costs and the price cap determines the upper bound on the costs of a “negawatt.” This necessary condition for LCP cannot be met within the traditional model of rate-of-return regulation so that other incentives (“shared saving”) induce the utility to undertake DSM. A profit-maximizing, regulated utility subverts the DSM expenditures to inflate the rate base yet minimizing the impact on revenues. Therefore, a rate-of-return regulated utility might favor “inefficient” conservation programs, which helps to explain that the costs of actual conservation exceed the a priori expectations by far. Finally, DSM as a permanent option will increase free riding substantially, due to strategic consumer reactions.