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Rent-seeking and X-inefficiency

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Abstract

This paper discusses the social cost of monopoly with special attention given to the geometric representation of that social cost, notably rent-seeking and X-inefficiency. The possibility of an overlap between these two measures is examined. In particular the paper addresses a problem of measure identification which highlights the need to reconsider the normative microfoundations of rent-seeking.

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Director, Centre in Economics and Law, University College Galway. The author acknowledges helpful comments from Roger Congleton and encouragement from Gordon Tullock. The usual disclaimer applies.

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McNutt, P.A. Rent-seeking and X-inefficiency. Public Choice 75, 371–378 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053446

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053446

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