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Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic: A comment

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  1. Insead, Boulevard de Constance, F-77305, Fontainebleau Cedex, France

    Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné

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  1. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
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Sinclair-Desgagné, B. Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic: A comment. Public Choice 76, 357–358 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053305

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