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I wish to thank Franco Cavallari who assisted me in the revision of the text and of the figures in the present work. Obviously the responsibility for any error is strictly mine.
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Forte, F. A cooperative game approach to optimal saving theory: Toward a constitution for savings. Public Choice 81, 339–362 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053237
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053237