Abstract
This paper contends the main virtue conventionally attributed to proportional electoral rules (i.e., effective representation of political views). It discusses a number of shortcomings that lead too much proportionality to a self-defeat: it reduces vote mobility through the strong cultivation of voters' loyalties; it smooths out vote variations when transforming them into seat variations; it reinforces intraparty ties to the detriment of vertical attention to constituents and it impinges on the working of checks-and-balances. The paper does not aim at a systematic evaluation of the properties of various voting systems, nor is it the proportional principle as such that is under attack. However, its combination with other institutional features can entrap voters in their own choices, thus nurturing political collusion. It is because of the ensuing lower influence of the voters on political decision-making that too much proportionality can lead to poor representation.
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An earlier version of this paper was presented as invited lecture at the Turin (1992) meeting of the European Public Choice Society. I would like to thank the participants for their comments. In addition, Antonio Forcina, Valentino Dardanoni, Ubaldo Pizzoli, Ron Wintrobe and an anonymous referee provided friendly help and useful criticisms.
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Galeotti, G. On proportional non-representation. Public Choice 80, 359–370 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053226
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01053226