Abstract
Several empirical studies have suggested that legislators engage in a surprisingly large degree of on-the-job consumption, or ideological behavior. These findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that legislators can be modelled as though they seek to maximize political support. This paper attempts to determine whether commonly used proxies for ideology in fact represent behavior to which voters are averse. The results show that legislators who engage in more of this behavior lose general-election support without generally receiving compensating increases in partyprimary support. A corollary to this result is that voters punish shirking legislators significantly.
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I am indebted to the members of my dissertation committee — Harold Demsetz (Chair), Jeffry Frieden, Benjamin Klein, Thomas Schwartz, Carol Simon, and Michael Waldman — for their invaluable assistance. I also acknowledge the helpful comments of Trudy Cameron, Paul Clyde, Kevin Grier, John Lott, Russell Roberts, and seminar participants at UCLA and the University of Chicago. The Bradley Foundation and the Foundation for Research in Economics and Education provided financial support. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Justice. Any errors are my own.
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Wright, M.B. Shirking and political support in the U.S. Senate, 1964–1984. Public Choice 76, 103–123 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049345
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049345