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Some reflections on the next twenty-five years of public choice

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Frans van Winden

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  1. Frans van Winden
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I gratefully acknowledge the comments of Jan Potters and Joep Sonnemans on an earlier version of this paper.

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van Winden, F. Some reflections on the next twenty-five years of public choice. Public Choice 77, 213–223 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049235

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