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The impending transformation of public choice scholarship

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I am grateful to Charles K. Rowley and Karen I. Vaughn for valuable advice on many of the issues I address here, and to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for its continuing support of my scholarly efforts.

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Wagner, R.E. The impending transformation of public choice scholarship. Public Choice 77, 203–212 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049234

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